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Vygotsky and Marxism
Danling Fu

There has been great interest in Vygotsky and in how his
views affect the understanding of learning and teaching since
the early 80's in the United States. Today, this interest continues to grow and Vygotsky's views continue to affect the
improvement and reform of contemporary education in the
United States. New interest in his theories has been sparked
too in Russia after his work has been decreed as reactionary
bourgeois pseudoscience for sixty years. Also after Vygotsky
has been labeled as an anti-Marxist bourgeois psychologist
for decades in his country, he is recognized as a devout Marxist. Russian Vygotskian expert, Toulmin (1981) wrote:
Vygotsky was happy to call himself a Marxist. The historicalmaterialist approach ensured the success of his scientific
investigations; this was the philosophy that armed him, gave
him the basis for integrating the sciences of developmental
psychology, clinical neurology, cultural anthropology, the
psychology of art. That is what we, psychologists of the West,
must now study seriously, (p. 79)
However, he is rarely connected with Marxism in the
United States, as Benjamin Lee stated, "American researchers have focused on his work on language and thought and
neglected his Marxist and functionalist side" (1985, p. 66),
even though his theory on individual consciousness development and his social and cultural constructivist approach are
well received by American educators. This neglect may
reveal a deliberate disconnection of Vygotsky from Marxism
among American scholars because most people in the United
States associate Marxism either with Communism or the
concept of class struggle, a concept rather threatening to many
Americans. Also, on the surface, Vygotsky's work on the
development of individual mind was hardly recognized
indebted to Marxist theory as, according to Haldane (1969),
"Marxism has extremely little positive to say about the
individual mind. It is concerned mainly with the social
relationships of the individual and the general materialistic
point of view" (p. 157). As a result, in his own country, only
until recently, Vygotsky had been seen as a target of Soviet
Marxists.
Vygotsky was a Marxist, though the content of his study
is remote from the content of Marx' and Engels' studies. The
former studied the internal structure of human mind; the
latter focused on the external structure of the human society.
Marxism, to Vygotsky, was not simply a weapon of ideology,
as it was to many mechanic Marxists, but a theory, or a scientific approach. He did not treat the Marxist methodology as a
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mathematical formula or recipe which guided him rigidly in
his psychological analysis. Instead, he digested it, in his word,
"internalized" it and transformed it into his own principle
which dominated his way of thinking and directed his study
of human psychological development. As he said "I don't
want to discover the nature of mind by patching together a
lot of quotations. I want to find out how science has to be
built, to approach the study of the mind having learned the
whole of Marx's method" (Mind in Society, p. 8). Vygotsky's
thinking and approach are Marxist, as claimed by Wertsch,
"in more subtle but no less fundamental ways," and his debt
to Marx "runs deeper than is commonly recognized" (1985,
p. 5).
To cut off Vygotsky from Marx is to look at him fragmentally and to separate his work from its theoretical basis.
The very act is anti-dialectical materialism, the fundamental
principle guiding Vygotsky's research and shaping his
analysis. A discussion of Vygotsky in the context of Marxism
will help us reach an understanding of the theoretic framework of Vygotsky's thinking. This understanding will lead us
to a more profound interpretation of Vygotsky's theory and
approach. Hopefully this discussion will also help readers
understand Marxist theory and methodology in some way. In
this article, based on two of Vygotsky's most known works
among American educators: Thought and Language and Mind
in Society (they are referred as Thought and Mind in the text),
I will examine how Vygotsky applied Marxist principles to
his study of human psychological development and present
in what way he was a Marxist. In doing so, first of all, we
have to review Marxist principles.

Dialectical

Materialism

The most fundamental doctrine of Marxist philosophy is
dialectical materialism, concerned with "the most general laws
of change and development in nature, society and thought"
(Jozef, 1981, p. 147). It is "materialism," because dialectical
materialism postulates that matter or material reality is
primary and its mental reflection is secondary or derivative.
Marx wrote, in the Preface to the second edition of Capital
(translated, 1967) that "the ideal is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind and translated into
forms of thought" (p. 253).
Dialectical materialism sees things in relations, analyzes
them and then reintegrates them into total movement.
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Bukharin (translation, 1961) states in his discussion on
dialectical materialism:
The world being in constant motion, we must consider
phenomena in their mutual relations, and not as isolated
cases. All portions of the universe are actually related to
each other and exert an influence on each other. The
slightest motion, the slightest alteration in one place,
simultaneously changes everything else. The change may
be great or small—that is another matter—at any rate,
there is a change, (p. 269)
Dialectical materialism asserts that matter is in a process of
constant moving and changing, so are its reflected mind,
thought and consciousness. In the first place, the dialectic
method of interpretation demands that all phenomena be
considered in their indissoluble relations: in the second place,
that they be considered in their state of motion. Dialectical
materialism as applied to human history is called historical
materialism, which is interested in development of the
process of BECOMING but not in the object of BEING, and
especially concerned with the original sources of the development, as Marx declares in his Capital (translated, 1967)
that "The object of our method of inquiry is to take possession of matter in its detail, to analyze its various forms of
development and to discover its inner law" (p. 56).
The materialist dialect is an analysis of the movement of
this content, and a reconstruction of the total movement. It is
a method of analysis for each degree and for each concrete
totality - for each original historical situation. At the same
time it is a synthetic method that sets itself the task of
comprehending the total movement. It does not lead to
axioms, constancies or permanencies, or to mere analogies,
but to laws of development.

Vygotsky's Marxist Methodology

Of Research

Vygotsky affirmed that "To study something historically
means to study it in the process of change; that is the dialectical method's basic demand"(A/md, p. 65). To understand
Vygotsky's analysis, first of all, we have to understand how
he approached his study. He constantly saw things in
relationships and showed great interest in the essence of the
relations and their complex dynamic natures. In his discussions about the relationship between the scientific concept
and the spontaneous concept in Thought and Language, we
see one relation lead to another, and they all directly or
indirectly relate to each other or influence each other ( p.
197). For him, those relations are not static as they are not
the products of the processes but are the processes themselves.
It is through his method of psychological analysis that
Vygotsky demonstrated himself to be a Marxist. In "The

Problems and the Approach" in Thought and Language and
"Problems of Method" in Mind in Society, Vygotsky clearly
revealed himself as a dialectical materialist in his search for
new methods of psycho-experimentation and analysis, which
he believed was "one of the most important problems of the
entire enterprise of understanding the uniquely human forms
of psychological activity. In this case, the method is simultaneously prerequisite and product, the tool and the result of
the study" {Mind, p. 65). In criticizing the current methods of
stimulus-response, which, he believed, analyze stable and
fixed objects, he advocated that psychological analysis of
objects should be contrasted with the analysis of processes,
which requires a dynamic display of the main points making
up the processes' history. He believed that "Any psychological process, whether the d e v e l o p m e n t of thought or
voluntary behavior, is a process undergoing changes right
before one's eyes" {Mind, p. 61). Therefore he declared that
"we need to concentrate not on the product of development
but on the very process by which higher f o r m s are
established" {Mind, p. 64) as he thought that the only way to
study the highest stages in the development of attention is to
understand it in all its idiosyncrasies and differences. In short,
we need to understand its origin.
In the end of the chapter "Problems of Method," Vygotsky
summarized his discussion by identifying three kinds of analyses which he believed are materialist dialectical approaches:
process analysis, analysis that reveals real, causal or dynamic
relations, and developmental analysis that returns to the source
and reconstructs all the points in the development of a given
structure. From these three approaches of analysis, we can
see he focused his attention on changing and believed that
the relationship between elements is the inner law which
causes the changing, and was interested in the history of the
development from its source to the possible future. Unlike
many of his colleagues, he refused to establish Marxist
psychology. In his discussion about the problems of
methods, he declared that "the dialectical method is quite
different in biology, history and psychology, and therefore,
there are no Marxist magic formulas for solving the problems of psychology." He emphasized that "[I]mmediate
application of the theory of dialectical materialism to the
problems of science, and particularly to biology and psychology, is impossible, as it is impossible to apply it instantly to
history and sociology." He strongly opposed "the method of
casually picking and choosing quotations from the classics
of Marxism" {Thought, xxiii) and concluded that "the only
legitimate way for Marxism to become useful for psychology was its possible contribution to general methodology"
{Thought, xxiii). For the rest of his life, as Kozulin comments
on Vygotsky in his introduction to Thought and Language,
"Vygotsky desperately sought this new m e t h o d o l o g y
(general m e t h o d o l o g y ) that would make p s y c h o l o g y
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scientific,... and that would make use of the Marxist method
without degenerating into 'Marxist psychology'" (xxiii). The
very attitude Vygotsky held in his searching for the method
demonstrated him as a dialectical materialist, or a Marxist.

Vygotsky's Dialectical Materialism
His Psychological
Analysis

in

Guided by the Marxist dialectical materialist theory,
Vygotsky directed his attention to the process of human
psychological development and drew his interest in finding
out the inner law which caused the changing and evolution
through analysis of the relation between biological or natural
function and cultural function. In Thought and Language and
Mind in Society he defined his psychological analysis
"developmental" and "historical-cultural," as he looked at the
changing processes and was especially interested in the inner
law of the development. He focused on "the historically
shaped and culturally transmitted psychology of human
beings" {Mind, p. 122). He also called his psychoanalysis
"instrumental," as he believed that psychology should not be
an end but a means to "telescope[s] changes" {Mind, p. 123).
Each chapter in Thought and Language and Mind in Society
deals with some aspects of developmental change as Vygotsky
conceived as the development, or transformation from
natural or "lower" functions to cultural or "higher" functions.
In Vygotsky's investigation of the transformation of lower
functions to higher functions in human psychology, he
considered each form in its growth and in it a necessary
disappearance in its relations with others. His study draws its
attention to the internal process of change. Take for example
his analysis of relationship between egocentric speech and
inner speech, one of the main discussions in his Thought and
Language. Rejecting Piaget's assumption which considers that
egocentric speech and social speech are two separate stages
in human psychological development, Vygotsky showed with
his experiments that egocentric speech is the transition from
social speech (interpersonal) to inner speech (intrapersonal).
Egocentric speech does not die out, or is not simply replaced
by social speech, as Piaget assumed, but is transformed or
developed into inner speech. The difference between Piaget's
and Vygotsky's analyses is the former studied the elements
in separation and focused on the products of the development; while the latter looked at them in relations and drew
attention to the process of changing. What separates Vygotsky
from other psychologists is his dialectical materialist view.
The three fundamental principles of dialectical materialism, asserted by Marx in his Capital, are the unity of opposites, the passage of quantity to quality, and the negation of
the negation. With this inner law of change, Marx and Engels
analyzed the change of social structures or the development
from the capitalist system to the socialist one. The process of
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transformation of capitalist society into socialist one, as Marx
conceived, is, first of all, the self-destruction of capitalism
which is caused by its internal conflicts of relations between
production and means of production, between labor and
productivity, and between use-value and exchange-value. In
the transformation of capitalism to socialism, first of all it is
the capital that is negating itself— "The monopoly of capital
becomes a fetter upon the mode of production" (Marx,
Capital, I, translated, 1967, p. 279). The self-negation is
followed by reconstruction and reorganization of the
economic structure and relationship, which causes a new form
of economic and social structure to appear—the coming of
socialism. Socialism, Marx conceived, is a higher stage than
capitalism in the social development.
Vygotsky approached the analysis of the relation between
the lower functions and higher functions with the principles
of dialectical materialism pragmatically but not mechanically.
He asserted that the transformation of lower functions to
higher functions involves the destruction, reconstruction and
transition of the former structure (elementary) to the structure of higher type. And "[hjigher psychological functions
are not superimposed as second story over the elementary
processes: they represent new psychological systems" {Mind,
p. 124). The process of transformation, as he saw, involves
the process of quantity to quality: first deconstruction, then
reconstruction and transition to a new structure of higher type.
These two levels are not simply two stages of development
or one replaces the other but one transforms into another
through internal conflicts, and structurally deconstruction and
reorganization.
When we parallel Vygotsky's approach to his analysis
of the transformation of lower functions to higher functions
with Marx's approach to his analysis of the transformation of
capitalist system to socialist system, we find that both of them
consider the change in relations between elements is the
inner law of the transformation, and the transformation
involves the process of deconstruction and reconstruction of
the former structure, which brings out the formation of a qualitatively new form. Marx presented specifically how the
relations change within each form, that is, how capitalism
deconstructs itself and how the relations of the social and
economic elements are reconstructed and reorganized into a
new form—socialism. However, Vygotsky only presented a
framework of the transformation of lower functions to higher
functions: from social interaction to internalization. He did
not show how the internalization actually happens, that is,
how the relations of the elements in lower functions are
deconstructed and reconstructed and reorganized into the new
form of higher functions. Vygotsky was aware of the importance of the study of the internalization, but his short life
span didn't give him a chance to fulfill his wish. The chapter
on "Interaction between Learning and Development" in Mind
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in Society reveals his awareness of the need of a study of this
internal process:
An aim of the psychological analysis of development is to
describe the internal relations of the intellectual processes awakened by school learning....If successful, it should reveal to the
teacher how developmental processed stimulated by the course
of school learning are carried through inside the head of each
individual child. The revelation of this internal, subterranean
developmental network of school subjects is a task of primary
importance for psychological and educational analysis, (p. 91)

I believe that if Vygotsky had lived longer, he would have
undertaken this task. His analysis of how internalization
happens would have been based on the three principles of
dialectical materialism b e c a u s e the p r o c e s s e s of
deconstruction and reconstruction must i n v o l v e the
operation of conflicts, negation and a transition of quantity
to quality.

The Dialectical Relationship
and Language

Between

Thought

With the dialectical approach, Vygotsky studied the
relationship between thought and speech, and between a
child's (actual) development and learning. In the chapter on
"Thought and Word," in Thought and Language, Vygotsky
opposed the approach which treated thought and speech as
two isolated elements and analyzed them separately. He held
that this method of analysis was not true analysis but only
helpful in solving concrete problems. As a historical materialist, Vygotsky saw thought and speech as a unit, "A word
without meaning is an empty sound; meaning, therefore, is a
criterion of 'word,' its indispensable as a phenomenon of
speech. But from the point of view of psychology, the meaning of every word is a generalization or a concept" (p. 212).
To illustrate his idea of the unit of thought and speech, he
used the term "word meanings," which, in his view, are
dynamic rather than static formations. "They change as the
child develops; they change also with the various ways in
which thought functions" (p. 217). He was opposed to the
assumption of his contemporary psychologists that the
development of a word's meaning is finished as soon as it
emerges and believed that they ignored the inner relationship
between thought and language. To discover the inner
relationship between thought and language, Vygotsky and his
colleagues studied the relations between inner speech and
external speech, between egocentric speech and inner speech,
and between word meaning and word sense. The studies
showed that, "The relation of thought to word is not a thing
but a process, a continual movement back and forth from
thought to word and from word to thought." Vygotsky
claimed: "Thought is not merely expressed in words; it comes
into existence through them" (p. 218).

It is how Vygotsky approached his study instead of what
he studied that demonstrated him as a dialectical or historical
materialist. He focused his attention on the process of
development and the interrelation of the elements in
psychology. Cornforth ( 1 9 6 3 ) in his discussion about
dialectical materialism states that, "The aim of the
dialectical method is to enable us logically and consistently
to express the real interconnections and motion of things" (p.
482). He went on to say in the next paragraph, "People with
a metaphysical approach try to express changing things in
fixed categories, and try to express the relations of things in
categories suited only to considering things in separation"
(p. 482). According to Cornforth's definition, Vygotsky's
method is a dialectic one.

Vygotsky's Dialectical View on the Relationship
Between the Child's Development and Learning
In his discussion on the relationship between the child's
actual development and learning, Vygotsky began his
discussions by criticizing the weaknesses of other methods
of psychological analysis. He accused Piaget and James of
failure to see the interaction between human development
and learning. To Piaget, development was always a prerequisite for learning; which learning "forms a superstructure over
development, leaving the latter essentially unaltered" {Mind,
p. 80). To James, the learning process was reduced to habit
formation and identified with development. And Koffka, as
Vygotsky saw, tried to overcome the extremes of Piaget and
James by simply combining the two. To Koffka, the two
processes of development and learning were mutually
dependent and interactive.
Different from them, Vygotsky thought that "the nature
of the interaction is left virtually unexplored in Koffka's work"
{Mind, p. 81). The rejection and analysis of the three
theoretic positions of Piaget, James and Koffka lead Vygotsky
to a more adequate view of the relation between learning and
development. Vygotsky believed that learning and development are interrelated from the child's very first day of life. In
the discussion of this interrelationship, he introduced his
concept of the zone of proximal development.
His notion of the zone of proximal development allows
us to "take account of not only the cycles and maturation
processes that have already been completed but also those
processes that are currently in a state of formation" {Mind, p.
87). This suggests that Vygotsky did not just keep his eyes on
what the development had achieved, or the product of the
development, but on the process of forming, or the dynamic
developmental state. In contrast to other theories in which
learning lags behind the process of development, he assumed
that learning aims for a new stage of the development
process.
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In the analysis of the relation between the actual
development and the zone of proximal development, he noted
that the former "characterizes mental development retrospectively," while the latter "characterizes mental development
prospectively" (Mind, p. 87). The learning creates the zone
of proximal development. The fundamental elements introduced by school learning into the children's development not
only awakens the internal relations of the intellectual processes, but also changes the way of the child's natural learning. Usually a child learns concrete objects or actions before
he learns abstract concepts in his real life experience. In
Vygotsky's terms, children learn spontaneous concepts
before scientific ones. But it is formal school learning that
reverses this role in the child's thinking. He learns abstract
concepts or scientific concepts in school learning, and his
understanding of scientific concepts, in turn, helps him
understand his spontaneous concepts better. This reverse in
learning or in thinking plays a significant part in the revolutionary transformations in the child's development.
Vygotsky saw the relations between development and
learning processes to be highly complex and dynamic. They
are not mutually exclusive as Piaget assumed, nor mutually
dependent as James proposed, neither interactive in the same
pattern as Koffka saw. The strength of Vygotsky's approach
is in seeing things in unity, in their inner relationship, and
their changing process. It is his historical materialist approach
that distinguishes him from other psychologists like Piaget,
James and Koffka.

Interrelationship of Language, School
and Human
Development

Learning

As a linguist, in addition to many other fields in which
he engaged in, Vygotsky showed his special interest in
language, or the relation between language and human
development. In Thought and Language and Mind in
Society, he describes language as a psychological tool that
has a fundamental effect on the human development. Marxism asserts that it is the use of tools that made humans different from other species, that transformed human into what
s/he is today, and that enabled him or her to master nature. In
psychological development, Vygotsky affirmed that it is the
use of language or the psychological tool that connects a
human with his/her external world, that helps a human
develop from the biological level to the conscious level and
that enables him/her to master his/her own action. For Marx
the use of tools made a revolutionary change in human
development: the change of human physically, the change of
human's relationship with nature, and change of human's
living style. For Vygotsky, the use of language also brings a
revolutionary change in human psychological development:
the change of individual's relationship with others, the change

Education and Culture

Spring, 1997 Vol. XIV No. 1

of one's relationship with self and the change of one's way of
thinking. "If one changes the tools of thinking available to a
child, his/her mind will have a radically different structure"
(Mind, p. 126). The use of tools and language brings humans
to a higher level of intelligence and consciousness and leads
to the change of themselves and the world.
Vygotsky asserted that both the use of language and
school learning contribute to the revolutionary change in
human development. Another characteristic of the use of
language and school learning is that they both happen at the
social level or interpersonal level first, and then at internal,
or intrapersonal level. As a materialist, Vygotsky saw human
as a product of nature and culture. Referring to psychological tools as instruments for the construction of higher
functions, Vygotsky wrote, "In the instrumental act, humans
master themselves from the outside—through psychological
tools." As to the structural role of interpersonal relations, he
claimed that intrapersonal processes are just transformed
interpersonal relations: "Each function in the child's cultural
d e v e l o p m e n t appears t w i c e ; first b e t w e e n p e o p l e
( i n t e r p s y c h o l o g i c a l ) and then inside the child
(intrapsychological) . . ." and "All the 'building blocks' of
higher behavior seem absolutely materialistic, and 'lower'
natural mental functions are structured and organized according to specifically human social goals and means of conduct"
('Thought, xxvi).
In psychology, social interaction is external activity,
which Vygotsky believed is not only conditionally connected
with the external environment but also makes internal activity possible. They internalize and reconstruct the operation
which initially represents an external activity. "Functional
systems are rooted in the most basic adaptive responses of
the organism, such as unconditioned and conditioned reflexes"
{Mind, p. 124).
Marxism asserts that when matter changes, it is the
external factors that stimulate the action and the internal
factors that reorganize and reconstruct the operation. It is like
water changing into ice or steam. Cold or hot temperature is
the external condition for change but the real change
happens within water itself. When the temperature reaches
freezing or boiling point, the structure of the chemicals of
water reconstructs into a new form. It is a transformation of
quantity to quality, which, dialectical materialism believes,
is one of the fundamental laws in the motion of matter.
About this, Lenin (1909) said that "it alone offers the
key to understanding 'leap,' to the 'interruption of gradual
succession,' to the 'transformation into the opposite,' to the
destruction of the old and the appearance of the new" (p. 175).
Vygotsky affirmed that internalization and reconstruction are
the transformation of an external activity, knowledge or
abilities into internal ones, which involves the passage of
quantity to quality. He said that it was "not a simple sum of
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elementary process as associationistic psychology saw, but a
qualitatively new form that appears in the process of transformation" (Mind, p. 65). His notion of the zone of proximal
development has the same theory that human learning
"presupposes a specific social nature and a process by which
children grow into the intellectual life of those around them"
(Mind, p. 88). And the real changes stimulated by the course
of school learning are "carried through inside the head of
each individual child" (Mind, p. 91). In summary, Vygotsky's
debt to Marxism was profoundly demonstrated through his
approach to his analysis of human psychological development. He directed his attention to changing process, saw things
in relationships and analyzed the human psychological
development with the three fundamental principles of
dialectical materialism: the unity of opposites, the passage of
quantity to quality, and the negation of the negation.

Pragmatism

and

Marxism

When I discussed Vygotsky in the context of Marxism, I
found a striking similarity between his Marxist approaches
of psychological analysis and pragmatism. Was Vygotsky a
Marxist or pragmatist? As do Marxists, he saw things in
relationships but not in isolation and analyzed the process of
becoming instead of the products of being. He focused his
attention on the inner law of changing as he believed that
matter and human consciousness were in a process of
constant moving and changing. But pragmatists hold exact
the same beliefs. They conceive evolution of a universe
being not finished, but, in James' term, "in the making," or
"in the process of becoming." In Roth's discussion of Dewey's
pragmatic view, Roth (1962) says:
Dewey viewed the world as ongoing and developing, he did
not view things in isolation. The basic characteristic of things
of nature is interaction. This is to say that things do not merely
act; they react or interact and in this interaction the onward
movement of nature is carried out. (p. 194)
The similarity between Dewey and Vygotsky shown above is
attributed to the similarity between pragmatism and
Marxism in a certain way. Dewey was viewed as a Marxist
by some American Marxists at the late 40's—"The most outstanding figure in the world today in whom the best elements
of Marx's thought are present is John Dewey . . . " (Novack,
1975, p. 273), and Lenin was presented "as an unavowed
disciple of Dewey in practice" (Novack, 1975, p. 296).
Actually pragmatism and Marxism are fundamentally different. Only by showing the differences between the two
philosophies, can we tell whether Vygotsky was a pragmatist
or Marxist.

The Relationship

Between Matter and Mind

The fundamental distinction between Marxism and
pragmatism is that they differ in their view of the relationship between matter and mind. Marxists believe that the
physical world is the prime reality, and mind is the reflected
reality of the physical world. Matter can exist apart from mind
but mind cannot exist without matter. Pragmatism holds that
matter and mind have an interdependent relationship. Dewey
(1958) said in his Experience and Nature that matter expresses
"a character of natural events and changes as they change;
their character of regular and stable order;" mind is "the
order of their meanings in their logical connections and
dependencies" (p. 58). To pragmatists, matter is viewed as
not regular but highly irregular, not orderly but chaotic,
depending on the level of approach to its manifestation
(Novack, 1975). Marxism affirms that matter causes mind,
as Engels (1888) said, "Matter is not a product of mind, but
mind itself is merely the highest product of nature" (p. 198).
Pragmatism, being against any causal connection between
matter and mind, believes that matter "covers lesser, more
external fields of interaction; the mind deals with wider, more
complex, more inward characteristics of events" (Novack,
1975, p. 288).
Vygotsky's agreement with the Marxist view of the causal
connection between matter and mind is clearly shown by his
notion of the two stages of psycho-development (first at the
social level, then at the internal level)—"All the higher functions originate as actual relationships between human
individuals" (Mind, p. 57), and his notion of the zone of proximal development (learning as a social activity)—"human
learning presupposes a specific social nature and a process
by which children grow into the intellectual life of those
around them" (Mind, p. 88). Social activity is the external
activity which causes or stimulates the internal action.
Vygotsky believed that the psychology of human beings is
historically shaped and culturally transmitted. Though both
Marxism and pragmatism assert that human development is
the process of interaction between external and internal
operations, the former holds that an individual grows into the
established culture, while the latter thinks that an individual
fulfills himself through interaction with his environment.
Vygotsky agreed with Marxism as he believed that "Children
grow into the intellectual life of those around them" (Mind,
p. 88).

The Relationship
World

Between Individual

and the

One of the reasons that Vygotsky was labeled as
anti-Marxist in his own country is his emphasis on the
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internalization or individualization of external activities and
knowledge, which is another distinction between Marxism
and pragmatism. Marxism pays very little attention to individuals, as it views individuals as simply products of society,
culture and nature unless they are taken as a collective force—
class, then they function differently in relationship with their
society and nature. On the contrary, pragmatism places great
emphasis on individuals. The dominant theme of Dewey's
philosophy is that human self-realization is achieved through
interaction with nature. In his Individualism Old and New,
Dewey (1930) said:
Individuality is at first spontaneous and unshaped; it is a
potentiality, a capacity of development. Even so, it is a unique
manner of acting in and with a world of objects and persons . .
. .Since individuality is a distinctive way of feeling the
impacts of the world and of showing a preferential bias in
response to these impacts, it develops into shape and form only
through interaction with actual conditions; it is no more
complete in itself than is a painter's tube of paint without
relations to a canvas, (p. 89)

Dewey viewed human development as the fulfillment of
human personality or self-realization. And the individual's
relation with the world is to find and fulfill oneself through
the interaction with the world. In turn, the self-realization
and self-fulfillment will help the world be fulfilled. Vygotsky's
emphasis on the importance of internalization and individualization in human psycho-development is different from
Dewey's. Internalization and individualization, to Vygotsky,
is the qualitative change stimulated by the external condition
happening within a substance itself, which Marxism holds as
one of the fundamental laws in the motion of matter.

The Process of Changing
Another difference between Marxism and pragmatism
lies in their interpretations of the processes of change in man
and nature. Though they both agree that the world is in the
process of changing or becoming, Marxism affirms that the
change is a transformation from one form to another, and the
processes of transformation involve deconstruction, reconstruction and reorganization of the old system or relations,
which bring out the appearance of a new form. Pragmatism
asserts that the processes of change are processes of fulfillment and completion through compromising, adaptation, and
adjustment. The change, to pragmatists, is not a transformation but an ongoing process toward fulfillment of individuals
and the world. The process of moving and changing is a
process of maintaining the moving equilibrium between an
individual and his environment.
The difference between Marxism and pragmatism in their
interpretation of the process of change leads to another
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distinction between them, that is, their view of human
development. Marxism holds that any development is hierarchical, in a systematic way from lower level to higher level.
Human society develops from primitive to slave, to feudal,
to capitalist, to socialist, and completes the development in
communist society, which, Marx believes, is the highest form
of human society. Pragmatists believe in multiplicity and
pluralism. They think that society and nature are essentially
indeterminate, so is Man. They are constantly in the process
of moving toward their fulfillment, not in stages or in a
systematic way, but in degrees or in the tendency toward
integration. About Dewey, Roth (1962) said that,
He was reluctant to single out any good as the summum bonum,
the highest good, to which all others are subordinate. His only
reservation was with regard to growth. Living, which means
intellectual and moral growth, is the dominant vocation of all
humans at all times, (p. 245)

Obviously Vygotsky belonged to the Marxist camp in
this aspect. This fact can be shown by the central theme in
his work: the transformation of lower functions to higher functions in human psychological development. As we discussed
before, Vygotsky analyzed this transformation as a process
of deconstruction, reconstruction and reorganization of one
form, the lower form which results in the appearance of a
new form, a higher form. The terms "lower level" and "higher
level" used by Vygotsky suggest that he was a believer in a
hierarchy in development.

Vygotsky—an Unorthodox

Marxist

I believe that it is because of his unorthodox approach to
Marxism that Vygotsky is so attractive to many American
intellectuals and was rejected by Russian Marxists for many
decades. In Psychology in Utopia, Kozulin (1984) comments
on Vygotsky that,
He took the writings of Marx absolutely seriously as a
philosophy and also as a concrete e p i s t e m o l o g y for the
political economy of the nineteenth century. At the same time
he gave no sign of submission to Marxism as an ideology. He
took the most sober and, at least under Soviet circumstances,
most difficult position: he treated Marx as a theoretician,
without prejudice, on a par with his treatment of Hegel, Freud,
and Durkheim. (p. 67)

Vygotsky was a real Marxist. As a person growing up in
a "Marxist" country, I know many people in the Marxist
countries tend to pile up the jargons of Marxism in their
speeches and writings, which makes them sound Marxist, but
they do not really know what Marxist principles are.
Actually they treat Marxism as a form, like rhetorical clothes,
and make their content match the form as if making their
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bodies match their clothes. Refusing to adopt Marxist theory
mechanically in his study, Vygotsky internalized Marxist
theory and approach to study human mind and read the world.
He was so natural as a Marxist, that even many people from
the countries in which Marxism is dominant cannot recognize him as Marxist. Perhaps also for this very reason that
many American intellectuals can accept him. He was a Marxist
scientist instead of a follower or a propagandist of Marxism.
And this same reason he was rejected by Russian Marxists
for many decades. Kozulin (1984) says that "The ban
imposed on its publication and the general reluctance to
reprint Vygotsky's works are due to the narrow-mindedness
of Soviet ideological bureaucrats, who have been frightened
by his unorthodox approach to Marxism" (p. 78). Bruner
(1986) thinks that "He was never hamstrung by the theoretical system in which he located himself—and he probably
suffered in consequence" (p. 156). I assume that besides the
reasons Kozulin and Bruner mentioned, it is his profession—
the study of the mind that doomed him as a Marxist. It is the
field which Marx had so little to do with, and which, the
radical Marxists believe, belongs to the middle class or
bourgeoisie, not the working class or proletarians. Genius will
always be discovered by the world, and now Vygotsky, a
"Sleeping Giant," is re-recognized by his own people and the
people of the world.
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